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A model for investment decision support based on multicriteria analysis
Irina Glazyrina
Institute of Natural Resources, Ecology and Cryology of SB RAS
Chita State Unversity

The conventional implementation of polluter pays principle (PPP) in many countries is based on the use of an environmental tax, which is determined proportionally to the amount of emissions of the polluting substances. Using a
specific mathematical model this study shows that this practice is not adequate for the real negative impact if the
pollutant accumulates to a stock in the environment. Moreover, in many cases there is a danger of an unavoidable
conflict between the interests of society as a whole and the interests of private business, generated by these procedures of PPP implementation. This paper also presents a mathematical formula (obtained as an analytical result)
which expresses the time period, when the conflict arises, therefore it is called “the time boundary of investment
expediency”. On the basis of the model analysis, “a corrected” amount of environmental tax which covers the negative effect on social welfare is suggested. One of results of the model analysis demonstrates that this tax should be
dependent on the lifetime of the production project, not only on the amount of emitted pollution. This approach allows to construct specific information system for the calculation of several indicators which provide quantitative
characteristics for evaluation of production projects (eco-intensity, eco-efficiency, interests on ecological debt etc.).
The information system can be used for comparative analysis of different investment projects and for the forecast of
the consequences of decision taken. The study gives also some practical tools for strengthening governance in the
environmental sector and for the evaluation of investment initiatives from a “quality of growth” point of view.
Keywords: polluter pays principle, stock pollution, conflict of interests

1. INTRODUCTION
A conceptual analysis of long-run decisions about the
economy and the environment as an application of
capital theory has been presented in the papers of
Faber et al, (1998), Baumgartner et al (2002). The
authors show that if a pollutant accumulates to a
stock in the environment, then there is an intertemporal leverage effect to the associated social cost
of pollution, depending on the lifetime of the pollutant. They used a specific mathematical model where
degradation rate of the pollutant and per unit social
cost are the parameters. When analyzing this model
they concluded that in this case (stock pollution) the
longer the time horizon, the less likely is the innovation of the new technique.
This conclusion has been made under a very important assumption: all social costs that society incurs
due to the damage from pollution are taken into account within the investment decision making. It is a
crucial idea of this paper’s background. We found
that a similar effect plays the key role for potential
conflicts between society and business in long-run
decisions. For our analysis we used the model from
Baumgartner et al, 2002 with a few modifications for
our purposes.
According to environmental legislation in Russia and
in some other countries the polluter must pay to the
state budget proportionally to the amount of emis-

sions. It is a kind of environmental tax; its size depends on the harm from the specific polluting substance. At the same time producers must make their
own efforts to reduce pollution, in order to avoid the
penalty for emissions exceeding the permitted (by
environmental standards) level. In our consideration
we denote by g the environmental cost of the producer, including the environmental tax (per unit of
emission).
The problem of economic growth is crucial for transition economies. The first reason of this is the goal of
overcoming poverty. However it is well known that
growth might be unsustainable. We cannot ignore the
fact that the poverty is an essential factor of environmental decay in Russia. An illustration of this insight
is the process of the apparent degradation of Russian
forest ecosystems. Industrial development increases
welfare, but at the same time usually has a negative
impact on the environment. The most important problem arising in this context is to find an optimal, or at
least an appropriate path between these “two evils”.
In Russia and many transitional countries large investment projects related to extraction and use of
natural resources, are the subject of governmental
consideration and need a permit in order to be implemented. Quality of growth indicators can provide
the information tools for this purpose. They are to be
the necessary components of integrated ecologicaleconomic approach to assess social consequences of
different development strategies

2. ECO-INTENSITY
Several quality of growth indicators can be considered as the criteria in the investment decisions.
We propose to use the well known indicators from
NAMEA, the European system of environmental
accounting (De Haan, 1996).
- eco-productivity:

Ep =

yj

e jp

- eco-intensity

Ei =
where

yj

e jp

yj

is the added value produced by a sec-

tor/enterprise (j), e jp – the amount of negative impact
on the environment of a type (p) from a sector
/enterprise (j).
We include in our system of criteria three
eco-intensity indicators: eco-intensity of atmosphere
emissions, eco-intensity of discharge into water, ecointensity of waste production and total eco-intensity
indicator. The total eco-intensity indicator Eиз for
investment project is defined by the formula:
Eиз = (Ea+Eо+Eв)/Y,
where Ea –is the quantity of atmosphere emissions;
Eо – quantity of wastes;
Eв – polluted water discharge;
Y – value added provided by the project
Eco-intensity indicators are very important. However
these indicators do not capture the effect of accumulation polluting substances into a stock in the natural
environment.
3. THE MODEL: POLLUTING SUBSTANCE
ACCUMULATES TO A STOCK IN THE
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
Follow the paper by Baumgartner et al (2002) we
introduce the per unit social cost of pollution in each
period of time and denote it by d > 0. It includes “all
direct and indirect costs of society incur due to the
danger from pollution” in one time period.
(Baumgartner et al, 2002, p.7). We do not discuss
here how we can calculate this cost. Anyway, it
might be far from the environmental tax and the polluter’s environmental costs. In practice, usually g <<
d, because many negative impacts are not taken into
account.
We consider a project of investment in a new enterprise (or to modernization of an existing enterprise).
The outcomes of this project will be produced goods

and, at the same time, a negative effects on the environment. Emissions can accumulate to a stock pollution. Below, by “firm” we mean the business actor
which makes the investment decision.
Now we can introduce the model.
The Model
M1. New investment results in the production of a
consumption good at a constant level q which is
sold by price p in every year i, i = 1,…n. We call n
the lifetime of the project, n > 1.
M2. The production cost is c > 0 per unit of consumption good and it does not depend on time.
M3. The present value of the fixed cost of investment
is f > 0 and there is no deterioration of the production
capital.
M4. An emission from production is e > 0 per unit of
consumption good.
M5. The negative impact of pollution on social welfare is proportional to the quantity of the accumulated
stock. It is estimated as d > 0 per unit of pollution
stock in each year.
M6. The initial pollution stock is equal to zero.
M7. The discount rate is r > 0 in each year.
M8. The pollutant accumulates to a stock in the natural environment. A constant fraction of the accumulated pollution stock naturally degrades; the natural
degradation rate is δ ∈ (0,1) .
M9. The total environmental cost of the producer,
including the environmental tax, is g >0 per unit
of emissions

4. FIRM’S PROFIT AND SOCIAL BENEFIT
The net present value of the firm’s profit we denote
by π (n) , where n is the firm’s time horizon. It is
easy to show that:
n
q( p − c − ge)
(1)
π ( n) = ∑
−f
(1 + r ) i
i =1
The inequality π (n) > 0) is a necessary condition for
the positive investment decision.
Now we try to estimate the benefit for society from
this project. Denote this benefit by B(n). Simple calculation shows that:
n
1 − (1 − δ ) t
B(n) = q ( p − c) ⋅ a(n, r ) − dqe∑
− f , (2)
t
t =1 δ (1 + r )
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We can also consider the case where there is no natural degradation of the polluting substance in the environment, i.e. δ = 0. In this case the amount of the
pollutant stock in the environment at the end of time
period t and the social cost are equal to (see also
(Baumgartner et al, 2002))

S t = qet and Dt = dS t = dqet
This implies that the social benefit for
be represented by the formula:

δ =0

may

n

n
t
1
−
dqe
−f =
∑
t
t
t =1 (1 + r )
t =1 (1 + r )
n
1
1
t
(3)
] − dqe∑
= q( p − c ) [1 −
−f
n
r
(1 + r )
(
1
+
r)t
t =1

B ( n) = q ( p − c ) ∑

Our model allows us to make a modeling simulation
in order to determine the time boundary of investment expediency (the “point of potential conflict”)
for specific projects depending on the main quantitative parameters (e, d, f , r, q and δ ∈ (0,1) ). We show
some results of such modeling in the Figures 1-2.

5. THE TIME BOUNDARY OF INVESTMENT
EXPEDIENCY
Obviously, π (n) is an increasing function with respect to n. One can see that the longer is the time
horizon, the more likely is the considered project to
be launched. On other hand, the function representing
the social benefit B(n) is not monotonic in general
(Glazyrina and Potravny, 2005). It monotonically
increases for all n if (p - c)δ ≥ de . But if
(p - c)δ < de it increases while n < β,

β=

ln(1 +

δ (p - c)

de
ln(1 - δ )

)

-1.

If n > β and (p - c)δ < de the function
decreasing.

(4)

π (n)

is

So if n > β the society as a whole is not interested in
a continuation of this project. If the project is implemented by private business and the company has to
pay the total social cost, the company may also not be
very interested in this investment. We call β, defined
by (4), the time boundary of investment expediency. It
might be also considered as a time indicator of “uneconomic growth” on the micro-level (Daly and Farley, 2003).
However, as we indicated above, the polluting company in Russia must pay an environmental tax proportional to the amount of emissions. Therefore it
does not pay the total social cost and its profit is determined by formula (1). So the company is not sensitive to the boundary of investment expediency, which
is important for society. In other words, the existing
procedure of the polluter pays principle (PPP) implementation (i.e. payment proportional to the
amount of emissions) generates a potential conflict
between private business and society as a whole.
While n > β the social benefit from the project is decreasing and the interests of society require the project not to proceed. At the same time the private
company is interested in its continuation. We can
conclude that economic imperfections (Munasinghe
and Cruz, 1995; Munasinghe, 1999) may influence
the quality of growth in the context of sustainability
(Panayotou, 1995)

Fig 1. Dynamics of a “point of potential conflict” in
dependence on production cost c. Market price p of
produced commodity, emissions e, negative impact of
pollution on social welfare d > 0 per unit of pollution
stock and assimilation coefficient δ are fixed. Point of
maximum equals β. (Glazyrina and Potravny, 2005).
Figures 1 shows the case when polluting substance
accumulates to a stock in the natural environment and
the natural degradation rate of this pollutant is
δ ∈ (0,1) . One can see that even when the project is
profitable from the commercial point of view (c < 0.5
p) it may be not desirable for society if its lifetime is
more that 5-6 years. In this situation there is a real
danger of the a conflict of interests.
In Figure 2 one can see the case when there is no
natural degradation of the pollutant in the environment. A conflict of interests may arise within the time
period 4-10 years even if the negative impact of pollution on social welfare d per unit of pollution stock
is less than 0.1p, i.e. it is comparatively small.
We see, that even in an ideal case, when the social
costs are totally estimated and taken into account,
there is a danger of a potential conflict between the
interests of society and those of private business. The
crucial circumstances for this conflict is the conventional implementation of the polluter pays principle
(PPP), when an environmental tax exists in the form
of a payment proportional to the amount of emissions
but does not depend on the lifetime of the pollutant.

It is obvious that h depends on the lifetime of the
project n and this is a very important factor. So we
suppose that h = h(n) and

1 − (1 − δ ) t
∑ δ (1 + r ) t
h(n) = de t =1 n
1
∑
t
t =1 (1 + r )
n

One can see that h(n) is a monotonically increasing
function with respect to n (Glazyrina and
Potravny,2005). So the next conclusion is that the
longer is the project lifetime, the higher needs to be
the environmental tax.

Fig.2. Dynamics of a “point of potential conflict” in
dependence on negative impact of pollution on social
welfare d per unit of pollution stock. There is no
natural degradation of the polluting substance in the
environment, i.e. δ = 0. Market price p of produced
commodity, production cost c, emissions с, assimilation coefficient δ and negative impact of pollution on
social welfare d > 0 per unit of pollution stock are
fixed. (Glazyrina and Potravny, 2005)
In our simulation modeling we have assumed that the
total environmental cost of the producer, including
the environmental tax, is (per unit of emission) equal
to the negative impact of the pollution on social welfare (per unit of pollution stock), i.e. g = d. One can
see that even in this optimistic case there is an unavoidable potential for conflict if (p - c)δ < de and
n < β, where β is he point of maximum for the function B(n), defined by formula (4)

It is essential that the “correct size” of the environmental tax h(n) should depend on a discount rate and
on the rate of natural degradation of the polluting
substance δ. To be accurate we should write h =
h(n,r,δ). We can see (Glazyrina and Potravny,
2005), that h(n,r,δ) is a decreasing function with respect to r and δ. This means, that:
(1) the larger is the rate of discount, the lower is
the environmental tax;
(2) the lower is the rate of natural degradation
of the pollutant, the higher is the environmental tax.
8. MICROECONOMIC QUALITY OF
GROWTH INDICATORS
The model analysis allows us to obtain the negative impact D(·) of pollution on social welfare in
monetary terms. We consider it in three cases:
1. Polluting substance naturally degrades in
a one period of time and does not influence the
environment in the next period:

7.”CORRECTED” ENVIRONMENTAL TAX
qde
(
1
+ r)i
i =1
n

The analysis presented in the previous sections demonstrates that a ”simple decision” in PPP implementation (when the environmental tax is determined
proportional to the amount of emissions and does not
depend on the lifetime of a project) is not adequate to
the real negative impact if the pollutant accumulates
to a stock in the environment. Now we shall try to
find “a corrected” amount for the environmental tax
which covers the negative effect on social welfare.
Let us denote by h the amount of the environmental
tax for the investment project described by the model
in Section 3. We obtained that the present (discounted) value of the total negative impact on social
welfare in the monetary form is equal to:

1 − (1 − δ ) t
D ( n) = dqe∑
t
t =1 δ (1 + r )

D=∑

2. The pollutant accumulates to a stock in
the natural environment. It naturally degrades;
the degradation rate is:
1 − (1 − δ )t
t
t =1 δ (1 + r )
n

D(δ ) = dqe ⋅ ∑

3. The natural degradation rate of pollutant
is close to zero:
n

D(0) = dqe ⋅ ∑
t =1

t
(1 + r )t

n

(see formula (2)). On the other hand, h must satisfy
the equation:

The total production of consumption good
within the project in monetary term is
n

Y =∑
i =1

n

D ( n) = h ∑
t =1

1
(1 + r ) t

qp
(1 + r )i

We propose the following environmental quality
of growth indicators on the micro-level (i.e. con-

nected with specific project) for each three cases
considered above:
•
•
•

MIn = D/Y, if the polluting substance naturally degrades in a one period of time;
MIn(δ)= D(δ) /Y, if there is natural degradation of the polluting substance, and
MIn(0) = D(0)/Y, in the case without natural
degradation of the polluting substance.

These indicators express the share of the interests
on ecological debt (from a considered project or
enterprise) in the total production.
If the pollutant accumulates to a stock the environmental quality of growth indicators MIn(δ)
and MIn(δ) depend on the lifetime of the project.
Both expressions MIn(δ) and MIn(δ) are increasing functions with respect to n. We provide the
analytic proof of this proposition.

Fig.4. Dependence of indicator MIn(δ) on the project
lifetime, δ= 0.5. (Glazyrina and Potravny,2005)
Our model analysis shows that the characteristics of
natural degradation of a pollutant and time horizon of
emissions are very important in the context of the
quality of economic growth.

Fig. 3. Dependence of indicator MIn(δ) on the project
lifetime, δ= 0.1 (Glazyrina and Potravny,2005)
There exist the upper bounds of MIn(δ) and
MIn(0) for all n. This result is also analytically
proved in (Glazyrina and Potravny,2005). We
obtain the following:

lim MIn(δ ) = ped
n →∞

lim MIn(0) = ped

n →∞

1+ r
,
r +δ

1+ r
,
r

With this model we can make a modeling simulation in order to calculate MIn(δ) and MIn(0).
Some results are presented on the Figures 3-5.

Fig. 5. Indicator MIn(0) in the case of no natural
degradation of the polluting substance (Glazyrina and Potravny,2005).
The simple analytic form of proposed indicators allows to make the forecast about long-term consequences of investment initiatives based on model
calculations. It is substantial in decision-making procedures when there exist a problem of choice between several alternatives of development

9. CONCLUSION
The notion “interests on ecological debt” has been
introduced by E.Ryumina (Ryumina, 2000, Glazyrina, 1998) . Interests on ecological debt consist of:
- a share of national income which society
has to use for restoration of environment, health care

because of pollution and deterioration of environment;
- a difference in national income which society cannot obtain because of deterioration of natural
resources and degradation of ecosystem services.
So we can consider D, D(δ), D(0) as a total discounted (with a rate r) input into interests on ecological debt from a specific production process. The
indicators MIn(δ) and MIn(0) therefore present the
input into interests on ecological debt per unit of production. They reflect the increasing harm from polluting substances which accumulate to a stock in the
natural environment. If we include the indicators
MIn(δ) and MIn(0) into the system of criteria in addition to “indicators of direct impact” like ecointensity, we obtain more comprehensive information
for decision-making.
This is important, because an adequate evaluation of
social costs is still a very difficult problem. Environmental legislation in transitional countries usually
underestimates these costs, so the way to “corrected“
environmental taxes seems to be far off in practice.
While the danger of potential conflict exists, it means
that society needs alternative, non monetary arguments to advocate its long-term interests (Söderbaum,
2000, 2004). It should be noted that this conflict may
arise in a country with conventional implementation
of PPP whether it is transitional or developed. But in
transitional countries, under conditions of limited
democracy and weakness of public institutions we
can expect the most negative consequences (Voinov
et al, 1999).
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